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Separated by a Common Language:
Awareness of Term Usage Differences
Between Languages and Disciplines in Biopreparedness
M. Gunnar Andersson, Katharina Tomuzia, Charlotta Lo¨fstro¨m, Bernd Appel, Luca Bano,
Haralampos Keremidis, Rickard Knutsson, Mikael Leijon, Susanna Ekstro¨mer Lo¨vgren, Dario De Medici,
Andrea Menrath, Bart J. van Rotterdam, Henk J. Wisselink, and Gary C. Barker
Preparedness for bioterrorism is based on communication between people in organizations who are educated and trained
in several disciplines, including law enforcement, health, and science. Various backgrounds, cultures, and vocabularies
generate difficulties in understanding and interpretating terms and concepts, which may impair communication. This is
especially true in emergency situations, in which the need for clarity and consistency is vital. The EU project AniBio-
Threat initiated methods and made a rough estimate of the terms and concepts that are crucial for an incident, and a pilot
database with key terms and definitions has been constructed. Analysis of collected terms and sources has shown that
many of the participating organizations use various international standards in their area of expertise. The same term often
represents different concepts in the standards from different sectors, or, alternatively, different terms were used to
represent the same or similar concepts. The use of conflicting terminology can be problematic for decision makers and
communicators in planning and prevention or when handling an incident. Since the CBRN area has roots in multiple
disciplines, each with its own evolving terminology, it may not be realistic to achieve unequivocal communication
through a standardized vocabulary and joint definitions for words from common language. We suggest that a com-
munication strategy should include awareness of alternative definitions and ontologies and the ability to talk and write
without relying on the implicit knowledge underlying specialized jargon. Consequently, cross-disciplinary communi-
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cation skills should be part of training of personnel in the CBRN field. In addition, a searchable repository of terms and
definitions from relevant organizations and authorities would be a valuable addition to existing glossaries for improving
awareness concerning bioterrorism prevention planning.
B ioterrorism preparedness is a cross-sectorial andinternational challenge, and there is a particular need
to harmonize terminology to obtain an improved level of
interoperability between various sectors such as law en-
forcement and public and animal health.1 Previous efforts
to integrate safety and security2 resulted in the Laboratory
Biorisk Management Standard CWA 15793:2008.3 Sub-
sequent work by the European Commission (EC) con-
cerning interoperability and standardization in security
resulted in the European Security Research and Innovation
(ESRIF) report,4 which highlights the importance of inte-
gration and connectivity because of their very specific en-
abling role both within and between the security missions.
Terminology, as part of communication, is an important
aspect of integration and connectivity, particularly in rela-
tion to the delivery of specialized knowledge in a concen-
trated form5 but also in relation to improved understanding
and increased trust when communicating with people
outside of a particular profession.4 In relation to bio-
terrorism, misunderstandings initiated by multidisciplinary
and multilingual communications can cause fatal prob-
lems.4 Communication, and hence terminology, is often
most crucial in stressful or crisis situations that require
clarity, consistency, and simplicity. The lack of commonly
accepted definitions for CBRN materials, threats, or inci-
dents has been pointed out,6 and during exercises and in-
cidents it has been observed that uncertainties about
definitions (eg, for bioterrorism and biocrime) may impair
decision making and delay a coordinated response.7 We
cannot propose an absolute terminology or even a stan-
dardized subset of definitions, but in this article we aim to
ensure that policymakers and other crucial CBRN per-
sonnel become aware of the pitfalls of assuming common
linguistic and conceptual backgrounds for multinational
and multidisciplinary communications concerning CBRN
preparedness. We derive support for this awareness from
examples of terms and definitions in current use, from
consultation with terminology experts from other disci-
plines and from other relevant projects concerned with
harmonized collections.
The relation between different terms and words in a
language is referred to as an ontology.8,9 An ontology can
be defined as a formal explicit specification of a shared
conceptualization; often it is an abstract model of relevant
concepts shared by people and groups. The ontology might
contain explicitly defined concepts and constraints for their
use and is often machine readable.10 Thus, an ontology
defines the terms used to describe and represent an area of
knowledge. However, in the absence of an explicit model, a
shared understanding of the relation between concepts and
lexical expressions (words or their combinations) may still
exist within a group of people or organizations that regu-
larly exchange messages and is of course essential for
meaningful communication.
Following Mojtahed et al,9 we refer to this shared con-
ceptualization as an implicit ontology. However, implicit
ontologies differ between languages and between members
of various disciplines using the same language. Failures of
communication can occur when the sender of a message,
oral or written, incorrectly assumes that the receiver has the
same implicit ontology. Similar problems are relevant in
many disciplines, particularly business, military intelli-
gence, medicine, and climatology. In many cases, the de-
velopment of an appropriate and consistent set of terms and
definitions used within a domain of interest—and relations
among terms in a domain ontology11-13—has been a major
step toward a better use of text sources. Identification,
collection, and communication of a minimum set of terms
and definitions often precedes more mechanistic analyses of
representative sets of text sources or corpora, such as text
analytics or natural language processing.14 The problems
associated with different ontologies have been extensively
studied in military command and control projects such as
IST-07515 and IST-09416 and within e-health,17,18 where
unambiguous interpretation and translation is vital. Stra-
tegies for designing linguistic support for risk communi-
cation, including the use of ontologies, was studied in the
Wide Information Network project to improve Risk
Management (WIN).10,19
The aim of this work was to initiate an appreciation of
terms and definitions in relation to biosafety, biosecurity,
and bioterrorism preparedness and to make policymakers
aware of the pitfalls associated with common linguistic and
conceptual assumptions. We do not generate an ontology
for use with bioterrorism communications, but we have
initiated a review of terms and definitions among several
relevant disciplines that are pertinent in this domain, and
we have compared common terms in a few languages. The
development involves established expertise and communi-
cation methods from several European laboratories and
agencies. In turn, this exercise highlights the potential for
developments in linguistic theory and technical solutions to
facilitate communication and translation. We hope that
this work will be a platform for more targeted investigations
of communication discontinuities and for the design of new
tools and techniques that can support improved multilin-
gual and multidisciplinary dialogue in relation to CBRN
preparedness.
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Materials and Methods
Collection of Terms and Definitions
Initially, proposals for terms were collected from a varied
set of subject experts, as a structured, annotated list in a flat
file. In the first instance, prospective terms were elicited
based on their importance for communications between
subject experts in distinct disciplines. The highest priority
was given to terms used in communication between au-
thorities and experts from different domains and to terms
describing activities shared between different expert groups.
Named entities (chemical names, microorganisms, orga-
nizations) and techniques used exclusively in a particular
discipline were given lower priority for addition to the
initial structure.
Each new record was broken down into several fields that
included the term and its definition, a provisional de-
scription of the domain from which the term originated
(eg, law, microbiology), synonyms, acronyms, and pointers
to other related terms that could cause confusion. The
provenance of the record and a source identifier were also
encoded as separate fields. Translations and definitions in
other languages were included when available (often direct
translation by project members).
Construction of Term Database
To manage the collection of terms and facilitate searching
and sorting of terms, the lists were imported into a MySQL
5.1.41 database (Oracle Corporation CA)20 and made ac-
cessible online using php tools (phpMyAdmin 3.3.2).21
The term relationships were included in separate fields for
generic relations (IS A), partitive relations (PART OF), and
associative relations (HAS TO DO WITH) (Figure 1). In
addition, extra definitions and notes were assigned to ad-
ditional fields. Almost all translations were in German or
Swedish, and additional fields were added for translated
terms, definitions, notes, and the like in both languages.
Concept Analysis and Terminology
Workshop
Further analysis of terms was performed with assistance
from the Swedish Centre for Terminology in Solna, Swe-
den (TNC).22 The aim was to find intentional defini-
tions—that is, definitions specifying the necessary and
sufficient conditions that delimit a concept. The first step
was to visualize the relation between concepts using generic,
partitive, and associative relations as exemplified in Figure
1. Following advice from TNC, a workshop was held in
which participants from different organizations sought to
agree on joint definitions of concepts related to risk/threat/
hazard and analysis/management thereof with the guidance
of the terminologists.
Results and Discussion
Identified Glossaries
While compiling the list of terms and definitions in this
study, numerous glossaries were identified that have been
developed in various disciplines at national and interna-
tional levels. At the EU level, the Inter-Active Terminology
for Europe (IATE)23 constitutes the EU interinstitutional
terminology database. A shortcoming is that it lacks rele-
vant definitions of many terms included in the domain of
bioterrorism and biological hazards, as well as from im-
portant international and national organizations.
The first version of the CBRN glossary was launched in
November 2012 under the direction of the EU Joint Re-
search Centre in Ispra in cooperation with EUROPOL &
DG HOME. This glossary is an information tool on
chemical, biological, radioactive, and nuclear hazards for
practitioners in protection and response, including police
officers, paramedics, and firefighters. It contains general
definitions of terms related to CBRN and associated ma-
terial and is translated into 23 European languages.24 While
not specifically intended for communication between sci-
entists, it can serve as a generic information database.
Relevant databases at a national level include the US
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) risk lexicon,25
the Australian Emergency Management (AEM) glossary,38
the Lexicon of UK Civil Protection Terminology,34 the
glossary of the German Federal Office of Civil Protection
and Disaster Assistance (BBK) ‘‘Ausgewa¨hltezentraleBe-
griffe des Bevo¨lkerungsschutzes’’ (‘‘Selected relevant terms
in Civil Protection,’’ 2011, available only in German), and
the glossary of the German Federal Institute for Consumer
Health Protection and Veterinary Medicine (BgVV)
‘‘GLOSSAR von Termini der Risikoanalyse’’ (approxima-
tely ‘‘Glossary of terms in risk analysis,’’ 2001, available in
German/English). As noted in Greciano and Budin,19
glossaries related to risk are either monolingual or bilingual
without language-specific definitions. A Multilingual and
Figure 1. Example of concept diagram with generic (angle),
partitive (grey tree), and associative (arrow) relations. The con-
cepts biosafety and biosecurity are PART OF biorisk management
which HAS TO DO WITH biorisk. The concept Biorisk IS A
risk, which in turn HAS TO DO WITH the concepts hazard,
likelihood. Finally, hazard HAS TO DO WITH consequences,
which in turn HAS TO DO WITH severity.
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Multimedia Glossary for Risk Management (MGRM)27
was prepared within the WIN project.28 This database,
however, has little or no coverage of terms related to CBRN
or crime fighting activities.
Identified Terms
The compound term database (October 23, 2012) con-
structed in this project contains 683 records or terms pro-
posed by one or several parties. For some terms, definitions
were obtained from more than one source. The number of
entries with English definitions is 543, representing 401
distinct terms. Major sources of definitions were official
documents from various institutions like the EC (n = 28),
the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) of the Food
and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
(FAO) (n = 110), the International Union of Pure and
Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) (n = 42), ISO (n = 139),
NATO (n = 20), Interpol (n = 13), CEN/TC 275 WG6
(n = 13), the International Vocabulary of Metrology (VIM)
(n = 19), the Association of Analytical Communities
(AOAC) (n = 7), the World Organisation for Animal
Health (OIE) (n = 6), Eurochem (n = 6), DHS (n = 4), the
WHO laboratory biosecurity guidance (n = 4), and various
scientific publications.
Differences in Terminology Between
Disciplines
Analysis showed that some of the terminology used by
stakeholders involved in CBRN preparedness has its roots
in disciplines and organizations that have a long history,
while other terms are being created from common language
or are redefined as the knowledge and practices in the field
evolve. Moreover, the collected definitions range from very
broad, exemplified by the definition of threat from DHS25
that covers essentially every meaning of the word in natural
language, to very narrow, exemplified by the definitions of
hazard from CAC29 or IUPAC,30 which includes delimi-
tation to food or chemical substances, respectively. The
variation in definitions and in the concepts behind the
terms is illustrated in the following examples.
Example: Risk, Threat, Hazard
Risk, threat, and hazard are commonly used terms in the
CBRN field with varying definitions, but they are also fa-
miliar in other areas such as risk analysis. The analysis made
by TNC indicated that threat is sometimes used as a syn-
onym for risk. Similarly, the terms hazard and risk are of-
ten, incorrectly, thought to be synonyms.31 Depending on
the context, the term risk could refer to ‘‘the likelihood/
probability of a harmful event,’’31 ‘‘a combination of
probability and severity,’’32 or sometimes a ‘‘combination
of threat, consequences and vulnerability.’’51 A broad def-
inition of threat is ‘‘natural or man-made occurrence, in-
dividual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential
to harm life, information, operations, the environment
and/or property.’’25 A concept analysis revealed that threat
may actually refer to several concepts including (1) indi-
cated threats, (2) intentional threats, and (3) natural threats
and that different organizations use the term in different
senses (ie, the ‘‘threat of an attack’’ or the ‘‘threat of negative
growth’’). The shift in emphasis is reflected in the following
definitions that focus on the indication (Threat 1), intent
(Threat 2), and crisis potential (Threat 3):
Threat 1: ‘‘An indication of possible violence, harm or
danger and may include an indication of intent and capa-
bility’’ (National Incident Management System, NIMS33).
Threat 2: ‘‘Intent and capacity to cause loss of life or create
adverse consequences to human welfare (including property
and the supply of essential services and commodities), the
environment or security.’’34 ‘‘A related definition is: ‘‘Like-
lihood for an adverse event to occur, as an expression of
intention to inflict evil, injury, disruption or damage.’’35
Threat 3: ‘‘The likelihood of occurrence of a hazard or
event with a harmful effect. In contrast to risk, a threat is not
related to the impact it may cause. In the context of public
health, a threat is defined as a substance, condition or event,
which by its presence has the potential to rapidly harm an
exposed population, sufficiently lead to a major crisis.’’24
The ambiguity is also reflected in the term threat assess-
ment, which is formally defined only in a security context,
as, for example, ‘‘strategic-intelligence products that provide
analysis of the capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities and
limitations of groups posing a crime or security threat.’’36
However, in a public health dialogue, threat assessment is
also used in a more general sense for assessing risks and
vulnerabilities associated with threats (eg, to human health).
Example: Risk Assessment
Terms related to assessment and analysis of risk were found
to be defined differently in standards from different orga-
nizations, including the OIE,37 the CAC,29 the CEN lab-
oratory biorisk management standard,3 the US DHS risk
lexicon,25 the AEM glossary,38 the Lexicon of UK Civil
Protection Terminology,34 and the FAO biosecurity
toolkit.39 Some differences in definition are reflections of
variation in methodology. For example, according to the
CAC guidelines,29,32 hazard identification is considered a
part of risk assessment, whereas in OIE guidelines,37 it is
considered an independent component of risk analysis
(Figure 2). In other contexts the overall process is analo-
gous, but the terms risk assessment and risk analysis have
been swapped, and risk management has been replaced by
risk evaluation (Figure 2).
Example: Scientific Terminology
Terms and definitions connected to assessing, verifying,
and reporting the performance of detection methods have
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been listed and defined in a large number of standards and
publications.40-44 Several examples were found in which the
same term is used to denote different concepts in different
contexts or where different terms are used for the same, or
almost the same, concept (Table 1). In contrast to the terms
related to risk, threat, and hazard, the terms related to de-
tection generally refer to well-delimited concepts, although
terminology and sometimes conceptualization differ be-
tween standards. Terms referring to microbiological and
chemical agents are generally well defined, but confusion
may occur due to the existence of multiple synonyms and
acronyms. The same organism may also be named and
defined differently depending on the context. Definitions
may be based on the organism’s position in the taxonomy
(evolutionary tree), its phenotypic characteristics (mor-
phology, chemistry), or on the clinical symptoms it causes.
Figure 2. Result from comparative analysis of concepts/ontologies involving analysis and assessment of risks. The concept systems for
animal health and food safety are based on (OIE 2011) and (CAC 2007a; CAC 2011), respectively. General risk management is a
generalized concept system based on definitions from the DHS risk lexicon, AEM glossary, the Laboratory biorisk management
standard, the UK cabinet office, and the Swedish Civil Contingency Agency.
Table 1. Example of Diversity of Terms in the Reporting of Performance of Detection Methods
Performance Criteria of a Method
Standard/guideline
Detecting all
variants of the
target analyte
Not detecting
nontarget analytes
No false
positives in
clinical setting
No false
negatives in
clinical setting
Lowest level
where target is
detected
(ISO22174 2005) Specificity
Detection limit/
Limit of detection
(ISO16140 2003) Inclusivity Exclusivity Specificity Sensitivity
(ISO/TR13843 2001) Sensitivity Specificity Sensitivity
(CAC 2009) Selectivity Selectivity Limit of detection
MIQE (Bustin et al. 2009)
Analytical
specificity Diagnostic specificity
Clinical
sensitivity
Analytical sensitivity/
Limit of detection
SEPARATED BY A COMMON LANGUAGE
S280 Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science
For example, the pathogenic Escherichia coli (E. coli) STEC
O104 that caused a major foodborne outbreak in Germany
in 201145 may be classified as a ‘‘Shiga toxin producing
Escherichia coli (STEC),’’ with the synonym of ‘‘verotoxi-
genic Escherichia coli’’ (VTEC) based on its capability to
produce a toxin or as an ‘‘enterohemorrhagic Escherichia
coli’’ (EHEC) based on the clinical symptoms it causes.
Most of this information can be retrieved from medical
ontologies such as SNOMED.46 For anthrax, as an exam-
ple, SNOMED lists the synonyms ‘‘Charbon,’’ ‘‘infection
due to Bacillus anthracis,’’ ‘‘milzbrand,’’ and ‘‘splenic fever.’’
Further, SNOMED includes the information that Bacillus
anthracis is the causative agent with the synonym Anthrax
bacillus and that it belongs to the Bacillus cereus group.
Definitions Versus Pragmatics
The rich variety of definitions reflects the fact that many
organizations and professions have assigned term status to a
set of general language words that have a special meaning in
each specialist domain. For a bystander, it may be difficult
to judge if the words encountered represent generally ac-
cepted terms or if they are part of local jargon. Terminol-
ogists from TNC assessed that not all entries in the term
collection should be considered as valid terms. According to
general terminology theory, definitions apply to concepts
and a word becomes a term only when the concept behind
the term is clearly delimited.5 Among the words and terms
analyzed in this project, the general approach to termi-
nology was applicable mainly for terms representing
physical objects (ie, substances, organisms, samples) and
their measurements (concentrations, detection limits). In
contrast, terms referring to objectives, procedures, or ac-
tivities could often be defined in this way only as part of a
specific protocol or method.
In the WIN project, it was observed that risk language is
‘‘action oriented,’’ with a high frequency of predicative
nouns expressing actions and processes (eg, assessment,
awareness, coordination) but also with standardized ex-
pressions for particular situations that result in strong af-
finities between text and context.19 In order to use and
understand these terms correctly, the semantic information
about a term (definition) must be accompanied by infor-
mation on its pragmatics (defined as the meaning of an
expression from a language in a specific context). In the
definitions lists and glossaries identified above, such infor-
mation is sometimes provided as comments. However,
making the distinction between definitions and comments
is the exception rather than the rule, and when alternative
definitions are provided, the comments are often insuffi-
cient to allow the identification of a superior choice.
Differences in Terminology Between
Languages
Translation between languages was found to constitute
another source of confusion. Many terms used are created
from words in natural language and have been translated
word by word, causing confusion (Table 2). A special
problem is that terminology and professional jargon in
many languages often involves the adaptation of English
words in a narrative sense and the loss of the associations
from natural language. The narrative cognition of words
often causes confusion when nonnatives are communicat-
ing in English, especially when the same word has been
assigned term status in different contexts.
A typical example is the distinction between security and
safety. In common usage, several languages use the same
word for safety and security, and, as a consequence, the same
term has been adopted for biosafety and biosecurity (Table
2). However, the term food security is now used widely (in
English) with a very broad meaning (including food chain
sustainability), and in many cases this includes food
Table 2. Example of Relation Between Terms from Different Languagesa
Preventing
unintentional release:
containment,
technologies, and
practices
Preventing
intentional actions:
Access/control/
security procedures
Scientific assessment
of risk by expert
body (eg, in food
safety, animal health)
Acute/ad hoc
assessment of risk
(eg, in laboratory,
at a crime scene)
Indication of threat
(eg, a spoken threat/
threat-ening someone)
Intentional threat:
likelihood
for an adverse
event as an expression
of intention
Natural threat:
substance, condition,
or event, with potential
to rapidly harm
a population
En Biosafety
Biosecurityb
Biosecurityb Risk assessment Risk assessment Threat Threat Threat
It Biosicurezza Bioprotezione
(Biosicurezza)
Valutazione del
Rischio
Valutazione del
rischio
Minaccia Minaccia Minaccia (naturale)
De Biosicherheit Biosicherheit Risikobewertung Risikoabscha¨tzung Drohung (Androhung) Bedrohung Gefahr
Sw Biosa¨kerhet Biosa¨kerhet (bioskydd) Riskva¨rdering (Risk-
bedo¨mning)
Riskbedo¨mning Hot Hot (Hotbild) Hot
Nl Biosafety Biosecurityb Risicobeoordeling Risico inschatting Dreiging Bedreiging Gevaar
Fr Se´curite´ biologique Suˆrete´ biologique ou
biose´curite´
Evaluation du risque Evaluation du risque Danger Danger Danger
Dk Biosikkerhed Biosikring Risikovurdering Trussels-vurdering Trussel Trussel Trussel
aThe languages included are English (En), Italian (It), German (De), Swedish (Sw), Dutch (Nl), French (Fr), and Danish (Dk).
bThe English term Biosecurity can be used specifically for the protection of biological agents from unauthorized use35 or in a more general sense
dealing with intentional as well as unintentional events.(eg, FAO2007). Biosecurity is sometimes also used in the meaning of preventing the
introduction and spreading of pathogenic bacteria and viruses on a farm, including cleaning and disinfection.
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safety.35,39,47 This means that a particular relationship be-
tween food security and food safety in English is masked by
linguistic relationships in some other languages. Perhaps
surprisingly, there are many differences between English
usage in the UK and in the USA; these differences are even
more apparent in relation to bioterrorism and biological
hazards because of the recent emphasis placed on bio-
terrorism by the US DHS. This counterintuitive disparity is
the origin of our title—‘‘separated by a common lan-
guage’’—referring to the UK and the USA; the quote is
variously attributed to Oscar Wilde and to Sir Winston
Churchill.
Implications for Communication
It has been noted that translators of scientific or technical
texts are faced with special challenges since the terms do not
represent only delimited concepts but also point at other
implicit knowledge underlying the information in the text.5
Consequently, finding correspondence between correlated
terms in different languages is not sufficient to make a
translation of CBRN texts. In analogy with this, an epi-
demiologist, a laboratory technician, or a police officer,
when asked to perform a risk- or threat assessment, would
rely on an implicit definition of the term but also on im-
plicit knowledge of the protocol to be used to delimit the
assigned task. Similarly, from one viewpoint, the terms
epizootic and contagious refer to infectious disease spreading
among animals and humans, respectively. However, in a
disease control context, the terms also point at legislation
that is well known by veterinarians and medical doctors but
not necessarily by police officers and scientists. This sug-
gests that even if it was possible to force joint terminology
and definitions on international and national organizations,
this would not be sufficient to ensure an unequivocal
communication standard since the terms would still be
associated with implicit knowledge.
It is well recognized, for example, in medicine, that a
professional terminology or jargon can contribute to effi-
cient communication in a group or profession while being a
barrier to understanding for people outside the group.26 It
has been claimed that standardized terminology is utopian,
since terminology is not static and term usage may reflect
knowledge, professional status, and even power relations in
groups of users.5,48
Disputes over terminology may take place when the use
of a term to categorize an activity of one organization is
interpreted as an intrusion into the domain of another
organization. Examples of sensitive terms identified in the
project are threat assessment, evaluation of evidence, and risk
management, which refer to activities that according to
some definitions should be done exclusively by the police,
the court, and the risk manager, respectively, the latter
being the ‘‘organization with authority to decide on the
acceptability of risk levels.’’49 In these situations, flexibility
and cooperation are more important than definitions.
It is commonly stated that organizations should adopt
joint definitions for common terms. However, it is im-
portant to be aware that this may be impossible or very
difficult in cases in which the same lexical expression has
been assigned term status in multiple contexts so that the
same expression may refer to different concepts. A joint
definition for such terms, including threat, biosecurity, and
risk analysis, would be broad and would probably not re-
flect the usage of the terms in practice. For the purpose of
supporting unequivocal communication, a consensus defi-
nition might be useless or even misleading unless it is ac-
companied by references to the domain-specific definition
or explanation. This is because the devil is often in the
details, and we have observed that miscommunication in
the CBRN field may result from a failure to recognize that a
word or expression is not used in its general sense but as a
term in a specific context.
Experience from the cross-disciplinary activities in this
project showed that unequivocal communication between
languages and disciplines can be achieved only through
awareness of the differences in terminologies and through
mutual respect. When sending a message, it is important to
recognize that the receiver may not use the same implicit
ontology, and, similarly, when receiving a message, it is
important to recognize that the intention of the sender may
be different from what you assume, based on your implicit
ontology. Consequently, the specialized terminology that is
very efficient within a group or profession may not be ap-
propriate in a cross-disciplinary context, since it relies too
much on implicit assumptions and knowledge. Special at-
tention should be paid to terms that, as in the examples
above, point at specific national laws, EU directives, or
instructions to authorities, and it may be good advice to
indicate clearly in the definition or in a note applied to
usage when a term is used in a legal context. However,
paying appropriate respect to terms with a specific meaning
in legislation is difficult without prior awareness, and ma-
chine reading tools, which scan a text for legal terms, may
be helpful for preventing misinterpretations.
In addition, it is important to recognize that the choice of
vocabulary/terminology may intentionally or unintention-
ally send signals that could either promote communication
or result in conflicts and suspicion. The conclusion is that
cross-disciplinary communication is not primarily about
joint definitions but rather about developing social skills
and learning to talk and write without relying on implicit
knowledge. Needless to say, texts describing agreements,
regulations, calls, and policies must not rely on implicit
understanding of terms or the sense in which they are used.
The first priority is to define the intention of authors, and
when terms are used, it is essential to provide a definition
that reflects this intention or to specify in which sense or
according to which domain ontology it is used. The term
risk management is a clear example; one should specify if this
term is used in the sense of the CAC procedural manual or
the laboratory biorisk management standard.
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Tools for Supporting Communication
A lot of time and resources have been invested in the
construction of glossaries and definition lists for CBRN,
but since most are in text format, it is time consuming to
find out if a particular term has alternative meanings or if
there are better synonyms. Although initiatives have been
undertaken to produce multilingual glossaries—in, for ex-
ample, CBRN24 and disaster risk management50—they are
largely ‘‘mono-disciplinary,’’ with each term (lexical ex-
pression) represented by a single entry. For example, the
definitions related to analysis and management of risk only
correspond to one of the alternative concept systems in
Figure 2, and there is no mechanism to handle situations as
in Table 2, where the appropriate translation is context
dependent. In order to handle such challenges, it is neces-
sary to represent terminologies as conceptual glossaries, in
which the concept rather than the lexical expression forms
the basis of an entry.19 A structured representation of the
terminologies from different organizations, constructed as
domain ontologies, may be a valuable complement to ex-
isting glossaries and definition lists and would facilitate
interdisciplinary comparisons. The large number of syno-
nyms, acronyms, and related terms also can be a problem
when text is read by computers—for example, in the search
for scientific literature or when social media or other in-
ternet resources are scanned for signals of bioterrorism. For
such applications, domain ontologies from different disci-
plines, including SNOMED,18,46 could be valuable re-
sources. Machine readable definitions also offer support for
visual representation of the relations between concepts and
may be more informative than a large number of inde-
pendent written definitions.
A computer-based tool that connects glossaries or
ontologies with a spell-checking or reference management
system may help to make users aware of alternative concepts
or systems and might encourage users to specify in which
sense a term is used. An introduction to ontologies for risk
management was produced in the WIN project.10
A structured query language (SQL) database, even in the
simple form developed as part of this project, is superior to
text files or spreadsheets for managing a term collection. An
SQL database is used to retrieve and sort terms and can be
used to address features like related terms, synonyms, ac-
ronyms, context, contributing organization, and source
reference. However, it is clear that the manual construction
of such a database, by copying or retyping terms and def-
initions from text lists, is laborious and may result in the
introduction of errors. Furthermore, definitions change
with time, and a static database rapidly becomes out of date
unless each competent body or organization continuously
updates its own terms and definitions. The problem with
manual maintenance and updating a database over time
will grow even larger if it contains structured terminologies
and ontologies from multiple domains and languages. Not
surprisingly, the experience of the health sector is that the
building of extensive ontology tools is extremely demand-
ing of resource. Large investments have already been made
to promote semantic interoperability in the defense and
health sectors. It is important that the existence of databases
like SNOMED18 and MGRM50 and the experience from
projects like IST-7515 and Semantic Health17 be consid-
ered before new terminology projects are initiated in the
CBRN field.
Glossaries from various disciplines and organizations
provide definitions that are valid in their domain, but in
bioterrorism communication a major obstacle is to identify
a suitable glossary for a particular task. In the short term,
the most valuable contribution might be a searchable re-
pository for glossaries and definition lists from different
competent bodies like NATO, DHS, Interpol, Europol,
EFSA, CAC, FAO, organizations like ISO and UIPAC,
projects, standards, and scientific publications. A glossary of
glossaries would be a useful tool for communicators,
translators, and others working in a cross-disciplinary field
and would be a valuable working tool for people and or-
ganizations developing and maintaining other official term-
banks, ontologies, and the like.
Conclusions
The use of terms and definitions in CBRN activity, and the
effect on the quality and integrity of multidisciplinary and
multilanguage communication, is complex and relatively
unstructured. As part of a multidisciplinary international
CBRN project, AniBioThreat, we have (1) examined the
incorporation of relevant terms and definitions in a pro-
totype database, (2) consulted with terminology experts in
relation to current usage, and (3) identified particular
terminology issues associated with project partners and
explored other projects that have addressed similar termi-
nologies. This exploration leads to some conclusions in
relation to improved awareness of existing issues and
challenges for future development of consistent commu-
nication strategies for CBRN.
 In the short term, the resolution of terminology differ-
ences between languages and disciplines appears im-
practical and an initial focus on improved awareness of
alternative definitions and ontologies, involving many
stakeholder groups, may be superior to the provision of
absolute or preferred definitions. This process places an
emphasis on social skills of specialist communicators and
on the use of common language rather than on the
alignment of specialist sets of terms.
 An effective system supporting CBRN communication
must integrate information on the semantics and prag-
matics of the terms—that is, definitions of the concepts
and information on how they are used in different con-
texts. Technological support for this process may follow
similar developments to those in other fields and may
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involve the development of a searchable scheme that
integrates several existing structures.
 Existing glossaries and term banks relating to CBRN
communications provide a large resource for the con-
sideration of terminology, but currently their integration
and annotation is weak. A process to establish represen-
tative corpora, suitable for machine-based analyses, may
be an appropriate step forward.
 Legal terms, and terms that relate to specific national
issues, present a particular problem for communications
during multinational CBRN operations.
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